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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THIRTY-DAY
MORATORIUM ON LAWYERS' DIRECT MAIL SOLICITATION OF ACCIDENT
VICTIMS. FLORIDA BAR V. WENT FOR IT, INC., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Few would argue that the legal profession has been subjected to
increasing criticism in the recent past.' In an effort to remedy some of this
dissatisfaction, the Florida Bar Association proposed several new regulations
concerning attorney advertising. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,2 the
United States Supreme Court upheld Florida's restriction on truthful direct
mail solicitation of accident victims by lawyers.3 In a five to four decision,
the Court rejected a lawyer's First Amendment challenge to a rule restricting
client solicitation for the first time since the mid-1970s.4
The practice of lawyer advertising has ebbed and flowed throughout
American history.5 For the majority of the twentieth century, questions
regarding lawyer advertising did not arise because the American Bar
Association strictly prohibited client solicitation in 1908.6 However, the
Supreme Court ruled this restriction unconstitutional in 1977 when it held
that two young lawyers had a First Amendment right to advertise their legal
services in a local newspaper.7 Since the 1977 decision, lawyer advertising
in both print and television has increased steadily.' Accompanying this
1. See A.B.A. COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS
7 (1995) (stating that "the legal community has a strong and increasing sense that over the
past several years the image of the profession has declined dramatically in the eyes of the
public"); Paul L. Stevens, Good Client Relations Are Essential to Restoring Public
Confidence in Lawyers, PA. LAW., July 1994, at 4 (finding that the legal profession absorbs
more criticism today than any time in the past).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995). Stewart McHenry owned Went For It, Inc., a lawyer
referral service, when this suit began. Id. at 2374.
3. Id. at 2381.
4. Richard C. Reuben, Florida Bar's Ad Restriction Constitutional, 81 A.B.A. J.,
August 1995, at 20.
5. See discussion infra part III.B.
6. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1908). "It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit .... It is disreputable to ... breed litigation
by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of
action in order to secure them as clients." Id.; see also Whitney Thier, In a Dignified
Manner: The Bar, The Court, and Lawyer Advertising, 66 TuL. L. REV. 527 (1991) (tracking
the history of the organized bar).
7. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a state could not
restrain a lawyer from publishing a truthful advertisement concerning the availability and
terms of routine legal services).
8. Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice,
74 B.U. L. REV. 723, 741 (1994) (stating, "[L]awyers' ads increasingly target personal
matters involving deep-seated emotions, in which the potential client most needs a friend and
a counselor."); see also Genevieve Lynn, States Attack Lawyers Ads, and Public is the Loser,
USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1995, at I0A (charting the growth in lawyer advertising since 1980).
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increase have been numerous challenges to state bars' authority to restrict
lawyer advertising.9 Consistently, these conflicts have been resolved in
favor of protecting attorneys' First Amendment rights and restricting states'
abilities to regulate "commercial speech."'"
This casenote begins with a brief description of the facts involved in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. It traces the development of the commer-
cial speech exception, emphasizing lawyer-advertising jurisprudence. The
note continues by analyzing the reasoning of the Florida Bar Court, and
concludes with a discussion of the significance of the Court's decision to
restrict a lawyer's freedom to advertise.
II. FACTS
In 1989, only twelve years after the United States Supreme Court ruled
that lawyers had the constitutional right to advertise," the Florida Bar
concluded a two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation. 2
Believing that the study supported its argument that direct mail solicitation
of accident victims by lawyers disturbed the public and reflected poorly
upon the legal profession, 3 the Bar submitted the study to the Florida
Supreme Court in support of its petition to amend the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar.'4 Together, as proposed by the Bar, Rules 4-7.4(b) 5 and 4-
9. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (challenging Ohio Bar
regulation prohibiting lawyers from accepting employment from a client to whom they gave
unsolicited advice); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (challenging a
regulation that prohibited targeted direct mail advertising by attorneys).
10. Roederick White, Sr., Constitutional Ethics: Lawyer Solicitation, 22 S.U. L. REV.
275 (1995). "Prior decisions by the Supreme Court have held firmly to the concept of
favoring lawyer free speech in the form of commercial advertising." Id. at 275-76.
11. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See supra note 7 for the
holding in Bates.
12. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995). See John DeVault,
Lawyer Ads Weaken Confidence, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1995, at 10A. The Bar began the
study in 1987 following Bar leaders' outrage at the practices of Florida lawyers following
a school bus accident that killed five handicapped children and the driver. Id. One attorney
called one of the victim's family within two hours of the accident; another stopped a family
member on a public street the next day; and other families received letters from lawyers
soliciting their business. Id.
13. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. The survey found that 54% of the population
surveyed felt that direct mail solicitation of accident victims was an invasion of privacy. Id.
Of those Floridians surveyed who had actually received direct mail solicitations from
lawyers: "45% believed that direct mail solicitation is designed to take advantage of gullible
or unstable people; 34% found such tactics annoying or irritating; 26% found it an invasion
of your privacy; and 24% reported that it made you angry." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, 27% said "that their regard for the legal profession and for the judicial process
as a whole was 'lower' as a result of receiving the direct mail." Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 2374, 2377. The Bar also submitted several actual letters from citizens
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7.8(a)16 created a complete ban on attorneys directly or indirectly soliciting
accident victims with a potential personal injury or wrongful death claim. 7
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Bar's rules affecting lawyer
advertising with little variation.' Based on United States Supreme Court
decisions regarding complete bans on attorney advertising, the Florida
Supreme Court tempered the Bar's proposal by placing a thirty-day
restriction on direct mail solicitation of potential personal injury and
wrongful death claimants.' 9 Relying on Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2 the court concluded that the
nature of attorney advertising warranted reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions." Of course, the new regulations were not welcomed by all
Florida lawyers.
In March 1992, Stewart McHenry and his lawyer referral service, Went
For It, Inc., filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
claiming that Rules 4-7.4(b) and 4-7.8(a) violated a lawyer's First Amend-
ment right to free speech.22 McHenry sought to continue his routine practice
of sending letters to potential plaintiffs within thirty days of an accident.23
complaining about direct mail tactics by lawyers. Id. at 2377-78.
15. FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) (1990) states:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent . . . a written
communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment if (a) the written communication concerns an action for personal
injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving
the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than thirty (30) days prior to the
mailing of the communication.
Id. (emphasis added because this portion was not included in the Bar's proposal).
16. FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.8(a) (1990) states:
A lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the
service: (1) engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact
with prospective clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer.
Id.
17. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
18. Id. at 459-60.
19. Id. at 459 (citing Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S.
91 (1990) and Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)). See also Julie Gannon
Shoop, Florida Supreme Court Approves New Rules for Lawyer Advertising, 27 TRIAL 20
(April 1991) (reporting several changes made by the Florida Supreme Court).
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21. Petition to Amend Rules, 571 So. 2d at 457-58.
22. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 66 F.3d 270
(1 1th Cir. 1995). McHenry also challenged the new rules under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 1544-45.
23. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
(No. 94-226).
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On September 24, 1992 the Florida Supreme Court disbarred McHenry
for an unrelated matter,24 and the case continued under the name of Went
For It, Inc.2 ' Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment, and
the district court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Charles Wilson.26
Judge Wilson concluded that the new rules did not violate a lawyer's
constitutional rights because they were narrowly drafted. Therefore, he
recommended the district court enter summary judgment in favor of the
Florida Bar.27  However, the district court abandoned the magistrate's
recommendation and entered summary judgment in favor of Went For It.
28
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
begrudgingly affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of Went For It.
29
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 0 and reversed the
Eleventh Circuit in a five-to-four decision, holding that Rules 4-7.4(b) and
4-7.8(a) satisfied the constitutional requirements of a state regulation of
commercial speech.3
III. BACKGROUND OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH LAW
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech .... Although the Constitution makes
no express distinction, in 1942 the United States Supreme Court distin-
guished commercial advertising from other forms of speech.33 The Court's
24. Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992) (disbarring McHenry after
finding him guilty of two counts of sexual misconduct in front of clients).
25. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Florida Bar (No. 94-226).
26. McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1544.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1548. The court held that the thirty-day ban on direct mail solicitation of
personal injury and wrongful death claimants violated a lawyer's rights to First Amendment
freedom of speech, Fifth Amendment due process, and Fourteenth Amendment due process
and equal protection. Id.
29. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1lth Cir. 1994). The court stated, "We are
disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the decision we reach today. We are forced to
recognize there are members of our profession who would mail solicitation letters to persons
in grief, and we find The Florida Bar's attempt to regulate such intrusions entirely
understandable." Id. at 1045.
30. 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
31. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment restriction is extended to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, which states, "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV., § 1.
33. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (upholding the constitutionality
of a New York City ordinance which prohibited the distribution of advertising handbills on
the street). Backed by no precedent, the Valentine Court found that the First Amendment
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definition of commercial speech has changed over time, and it now
generally involves speech that is entered into for the economic benefit of the
speaker.34
A. Constitutional Evaluation and Commercial Speech
When faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of a government
regulation of speech, whether commercial or ordinary, a court examines the
value of the questioned speech as it pertains to the advancement of our
democratic ideals of self-government.35 In order to properly consider such
a challenge, the court must determine what level of scrutiny to apply. 6
Central to this decision is whether the regulation is content-neutral or
content-based.37 The distinction is important because it results in content-
did not extend to speech concerning commercial transactions and that the government could
freely regulate this type of speech. Id. This distinction has come to be known as the
"commercial speech" exception. But see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 159 (1939)
(making a passing reference to the concept of the "commercial speech" exception).
34. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (defining commercial speech as an "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience"). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining commercial speech as
that "which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"') (quoting Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1972)).
35. See Thomas W. Merrill, Comment First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205, 225-26 (1976) (citing
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973)).
36. Id. at 225. Courts apply either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.02[1] [a]-[b] (1994). For a regulation to survive strict scrutiny the
government must have a compelling interest at stake, and the regulation must be "narrowly
tailored" to serve that interest. Id. § 3.03[l][a]. Intermediate scrutiny lessens the burden on
the government by requiring only a substantial government interest, and not requiring that
the least restrictive means be used to protect this interest. Id. § 12.01[3][a]. Finally, under
rational basis scrutiny, the government must only show it is conceivable that the regulation
bears a rational relation to a legitimate end not prohibited by the Constitution. Id.
§ 3.02[1][b] (citing JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th
ed. 1991)).
37. SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 3.02[1][a]-[b]. Content-neutral regulations limit speech
without regard to the content of the speech and are typically evaluated under the intermediate
level of scrutiny. SMOLLA, supra note 36, §§ 3.01[2][b][1], 3.02[1] [b]. See, e.g., Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding a time, place, and manner regulation
that prohibited citizens from making noise that disturbed peace and order on grounds adjacent
to school buildings, regardless of the source of the noise). Content-based regulations, which
are subject to strict scrutiny, seek to restrict the actual words and messages of speech.
SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 3.01[2][b][1]. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 106 (1991) (invalidating New York's "Son of Sam" law which
required accused or convicted criminals to deposit all income from commercial works
describing their criminal act into a crime victims compensation fund because this law only
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based regulations being overturned more frequently than content-neutral
regulations.38
The Supreme Court set forth the present standard for evaluating
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission.39 The Court applied the intermediate level of scrutiny
to commercial speech.4" Relying on the definition of commercial speech
used in Virginia Board,41 the Court reasoned that common sense should be
used to determine whether the speech at issue proposed a commercial
transaction.42 In its analysis, the Court developed a four-prong test to
determine the constitutionality of a government regulation of commercial
speech.43 First, the court must determine whether the regulated speech is
false, misleading, or proposing an illegal activity, because the First
Amendment never protects these categories of speech." Second, the court
must examine whether the government is protecting a substantial societal
interest by its regulation of the commercial speech.45 Third, the court must
determine whether the restriction on commercial speech "directly advances
the governmental interest asserted." '46 Fourth, the court must determine if
the regulation is overbroad and encompasses too much speech.47
addressed speech with specific content). Rational-basis scrutiny is generally used in modem
equal protection cases. SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 12.01[3][b]. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding a New York City traffic
ordinance that restricted advertisements on the side of vehicles stating that "the classification
has relation to the purpose for which it is made and does not contain the kind of
discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection").
38. Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN.
L. REv. 113, 134 (1981).
39. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery,
and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX.
L. REv. 777, 791 n.57 (1993). See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of intermediate scrutiny criteria.
41. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976). See supra note 34 for definition of commercial speech.
42. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562. The "common sense" analysis has been relied
upon in many of the Court's decisions following Central Hudson. See, e.g., Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506
(1981).
43. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
44. Id. at 564.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 566, 569-70. This standard requires a "reasonable fit" between the regulation
and the asserted interest. See also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). The Fox
Court held that simply because a regulation did not follow the "least restrictive means"
method, it was not invalid, even if the state interest could be achieved with less speech being
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Although the Supreme Court had finally established a test to evaluate
regulations of commercial speech, confusion still remained as to how to
apply the test and exactly what the prongs of the test meant.48
B. Lawyer Advertising and the Commercial Speech Exception
In colonial America attorneys did not advertise, even though no
professional associations prohibited the practice.49 During that period, the
public considered law an elite and honorable profession, and early American
lawyers were continuing the traditions of the English lawyers under whom
they trained." But in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the American
political climate changed and the public began to distrust the legal
profession. The organized bar lost its tight control on the legal profession,
standards of the profession declined,5 and more and more lawyers began to
advertise their services. 2
By the late nineteenth century, the legal profession had lost much of its
dignity.53 Organized bars began raising the standards for admission to the
bar and passing ethical guidelines in an effort to regain the honor lost by the
profession. 4 As part of this effort, the American Bar Association passed
burdened. Id. at 480.
48. See Frederick Shauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. CN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1988) (proclaiming the irreconcilability of
Pasadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) and Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)). Although some
questions may remain, the Court reaffirmed its reliance on Central Hudson during the 1994
term in both Florida Bar and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)
(disallowing a ban on specifying alcohol content on beer labels).
49. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-12 (1953); see also LORI B. ANDREWS,
BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING & SOLICITATION 1 (1980). This idea traces
its roots to ancient Greece and Rome. The Greeks and Romans prohibited lawyer solicitation
for fear that it would lead to "vexatious suits or domination of society by the rich." Id.
50. See generally Paul H. Francis & Jennifer J. Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes:
Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 221 (1977). "Competition for
clients was repugnant to this group [English lawyers] because it would render impossible the
intimacy they had known and also reduce their professional calling to the status of a trade."
Id. at 224. See also DRINKER, supra note 49, at 211 (explaining that American lawyers did
not advertise and solicit clients even though they were not as "intimate a fraternity" as their
English counterparts).
51. Francis & Johnson, supra note 50, at 224-25 (explaining that "educational as well
as other standards for admission to the practice of law were minimal or nonexistent").
52. Id. See Roger Parloff, Hard Sell, AM. LAW., June 1995, at 62 (1995) (discussing
early advertising, including a 1852 newspaper advertisement for Abraham Lincoln which
read, "Lincoln & Lamon, ATTORNEYS AT LAW ... all business entrusted to them will
be attended to with promptness and fidelity").
53. DRINKER, supra note 49, at 20.
54. DRINKER, supra note 49, at 20. Addressing lawyer advertising, Drinker wrote, "A
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ethical guidelines in 1908 that, in part, completely banned all commercial
advertising by lawyers. 5  American courts simply discounted lawyer
advertising as unprotected commercial speech until the 1970s when the
Valentine Court's decision began to erode. 6
Advertising within the legal profession began to change dramatically
with the Bates v. State Bar of Arizona decision. 7 In Bates, two young
attorneys, John R. Bates and Van O'Steen, sought to provide modestly
priced legal services to people who made too much money to qualify for
free legal aid, but who certainly did not have adequate income to pay
normal attorney fees. 58 Because their targeted clientele was unlikely to have
broad access to information about legal representation, Bates and O'Steen
decided to advertise their services in the local newspaper,59 in direct
violation of Arizona's code of professional ethics.' In defense of his action,
Bates argued that the Arizona rule violated his First Amendment right to
free speech.6"
lawyer who advertises, solicits or steals another's clients is regarded by his brethren at the
bar as one with whom it is not pleasant to associate ...." DRINKER, supra note 49, at 211
n.6.
55. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1908). See supra note 6 for text of
Canon 28. See also Thier, supra note 6, at 532. "[T]he Canons' thrust was to prevent 'the
shyster, the barratrously inclined, the ambulance chaser from reducing the profession to a
mere money-grasping venture." Thier, supra note 6, at 532 (quoting A.B.A. COMM. ON CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29
A.B.A. REP. 600, 601 (1906)).
56. See supra note 33 for discussion of Valentine decision. See also Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (demonstrating the shift
from the use of the term "advertising" to "commercial speech"); Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 747, 756-
57 (1993) (explaining the erosion of the Valentine decision and that the term "speech"
suggests the possibility of First Amendment protection).
57. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Court "dramatically liberalized the regulation
of advertising by professionals." SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 12.03 [1][a][i]. Please note,
however, that the Court carefully limited its decision by holding, "The constitutional issue
in this case is only whether the State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of
appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal
services." Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
58. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354.
59. See id. The advertisement included the flat fee they charged for various basic legal
services, including uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, and simple personal
bankruptcies. Id.
60. The Bar contended that Bates violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), incorporated in
Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 17A ARIz. REv. STAT., p.26 (Supp. 1976),
which stated in relevant part, "A lawyer shall not publicize himself.., through newspaper
or magazine advertisements ...." Bates, 433 U.S. at 355-56.
61. Bates, 433 U.S. at 356.
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In an effort to justify the rule, the State argued that lawyer advertising
had a negative effect on professionalism, 62 a "misleading nature, '"63 an
"adverse effect on the administration of justice,"' an "undesirable economic
effect,"65 and a detrimental effect on the quality of legal services.66 The
Court rejected these arguments,67 and ruled that such a blanket ban on
lawyer advertising, which had essentially been accepted since 1908, was
overinclusive and violative of the First Amendment.68 Following the Bates
ruling, the American Bar Association revised its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, allowing only the simple advertising upheld by the Bates
Court.
69
One year after Bates, the Court addressed in-person solicitation in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.7° With Ohralik and its companion
case, In re Primus,71 the Court began to define the constitutional limits of
state regulation of attorney solicitation.72
In Ohralik, the Court ruled that a state could prevent a lawyer from
soliciting clients in-person for pecuniary gain when the solicitation posed a
legitimate danger to the potential client.73 Ohralik, an attorney, had obtained
a representation contract in-person from an accident victim, while she lay
in traction in the hospital.74 After leaving the hospital, the victim fired
Ohralik as counsel, and Ohralik sued her for breaching the representation
62. Id. at 368-72.
63. Id. at 372-75.
64. Id. at 375-77.
65. Id. at 377-78.
66. Id. at 378-79.
67. Id. at 379. Bates only addressed lawyer advertising of prices, and did not speak to
in-person solicitation or advertisement of quality of legal services. Id. at 366-67.
68. Id. at 383.
69. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 2-101
(1977), reprinted in, House of Delegates Adopts Advertising D.R. and Endorses a Package
of Grand Jury Reforms, 63 A.B.A. J. 1234, 1235-36 (1977) (permitting simple print media
and radio advertising and later amended to include simple television advertising). See also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market
Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1086 (1983). The A.B.A. hesitated to
expand its rule any further than required, as evident by its rejection of a proposal to allow
all "advertising that was not false, fraudulent, or misleading." Id. (citation omitted).
70. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
71. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
72. SMOLLA, supra note 36, § 12.03[l][ii].
73. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 459. This must be a danger the state has an interest in
protecting. Id.
74. Id. at 449-50.
1996]
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contract." Responding to the victim's complaint,76 the Grievance Commit-
tee of the local bar and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that Ohralik's
conduct violated Ohio's solicitation rules.77
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that Ohio's rule did
not violate Ohralik's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.7" It reasoned
that while lawyer advertising deserved some protection, that protection must
be tempered in light of the state's interest.79 Interestingly, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, accepted as substantial the Ohio Bar's argument
that lawyer advertising adversely affected the reputation of the legal
profession."0 The Court had expressly rejected this justification only one
year earlier in Bates.s" The Court also agreed with the State's argument that
in-person solicitation is more likely than other forms of advertising to
pressure accident victims into making an immediate decision.8 2 Further-
more, the Court rejected Ohralik's argument that the State must prove actual
harm to the client before sanctions can be imposed.83 Through Ohralik, the
Court further demonstrated how commercial speech receives less protection
than other forms of speech. s4
The Court slightly tempered its Ohralik holding in In re Primus,85 when
it ruled that South Carolina had gone too far in regulating lawyer advertis-
ing." The Court reversed a South Carolina ruling imposing a publicreprimand on Edna Primus for violation of solicitation rules.8 7 Primus wrote
75. Id. at 452. Ohralik had proof of the agreement because he had a hidden tape
recorder during his visit to the hospital. Id. at 450. The young lady settled the suit by
giving Ohralik one-third of her award, which the original contract required. Id. at 452.
76. Id. at 452.
77. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1976), af'd, 436 U.S. 447
(1978). The rules at issue prohibited a lawyer from accepting employment from a layman
when the lawyer gave unsolicited advice recommending legal action unless that layman was
a close friend, relative, former client of the same nature, or one who the lawyer reasonably
believed was a client. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rules 2-
103(A) & 2-104(A) (1970).
78. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
79. Id. at 459.
80. Id. at 454-56, 460-61.
81. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977).
82. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58. In-person solicitation provided no time for
intervention or education from the bar or others. Id.
83. Id. at 464. The Court stated that the rules prohibiting solicitation were prophylactic
in nature and were there to prevent lawyers from engaging in conduct "likely to result in the
adverse consequences the State seeks to avert." Id.
84. Clyde D. Stoltenberg & Douglas Whitman, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45
U. PITr. L. REv. 381, 393 (1984).
85. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
86. Id. at 439.
87. In re Smith, 233 S.E.2d 301 (S.C. 1977), rev'd sub nom. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978). South Carolina Disciplinary Rules 2-103(D)(5)(a) and 2-104(A)(5) stated that a
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a letter to an indigent woman explaining that the ACLU would provide free
legal services if she wished to bring suit for the sterilization she underwent
as a condition of receiving public medical assistance."8 The Court
distinguished this case from Ohralik and noted that Primus solicited his
client by letter, not in-person.89 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
Primus's actions were not taken in expectation of pecuniary gain; rather,
they were taken as a form of political association and expression."
In 1982, the Court found it necessary to reemphasize the Bates Court's
protection of attorney advertising in In re R.MJ.9' State bar associations
had responded to Bates and its progeny by eliminating their complete bans
and passing new ethical rules that allowed "minimal advertising. 9 2 While
the states were complying with the letter of the Bates Court ruling, they
were not adhering to the spirit of the law. 93 After the Court's ruling in
Bates, the state of Missouri passed a rule specifically limiting the content of
lawyer advertising 4 and the ability of lawyers to mail announcements of
changes of address, or like matters.95 Charges were brought against R.M.J.
before the Missouri Supreme Court claiming that he violated these ethical
rules after he ran an advertisement stating, in capital letters, that he was
admitted to practice before the United State Supreme Court, listing areas of
practice not approved by the court, and not containing the appropriate
disclaimer.96
lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends, furnishes, or
pays for legal services to promote use of his services. Id. at 304-05.
88. Primus, 436 U.S. at 416-17 & n.6.
89. Id. at 422.
90. Id. at 422. The Court found that the letter was sent "to express [Primus's] political
beliefs" and held that the regulation must be drawn narrowly to prevent "any unnecessary
abridgement of associational freedom." Id. at 422, 432-33.
91. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
92. Stoltenberg & Whitman, supra note 84, at 381-82.
93. Stoltenberg & Whitman, supra note 84, at 381-82. "[Sjome rules so restrict[ed]
effective advertising that attorneys might find it economically unfeasible to advertise, thus
depriving the public of any information whatsoever." Stoltenberg & Whitman, supra note
84, at 381-82 n.5 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 193-96. Mo. REV. STAT., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) (1978)
(Index Vol.), provided that a lawyer could only list the following information in a newspaper,
periodical, or Yellow Pages advertisement: name, address, telephone number, areas of
practice, date and place of birth, schools attended, foreign languages spoken, office hours,
fee for an initial consultation, availability of a schedule of fees, credit arrangements, and the
fixed fee to be charged for routine services. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 194. Furthermore, the
Rule enumerated limited areas of specialty that could be included in the advertisement. Id.
at 194-95. In addition, any use of an area of specialty must be followed by a disclaimer
stating that the lawyer "does not indicate any certification of expertise" in that area of the
law. Id. at 195-96 n.4 (quoting Rule 4, Addendum III (Adv. Comm., Nov., 13, 1977)).
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id. at 197-98 (citing Matter of R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S.
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On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court accepted R.M.J.'s argument
that the rules violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and further
expanded its protection of lawyer advertising.97 The Court ruled that, while
states may prohibit all misleading advertising, they may not put a blanket
ban on all potentially misleading advertisements.9" In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found that the State failed to assert any substantial
interests protected by the regulation." Writing for the Court, Justice Powell
acknowledged that certain limitations, short of a complete ban, could be
appropriate.' 00
The Court continued to dismantle the traditional ban on attorney
advertising in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court.'O' Zauderer's law firm ran an advertisement in Ohio newspapers
stating that the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD) apparently had
caused numerous health complications in women.0 2 The advertisement
stated that Zauderer's law firm was willing to represent women who
suffered injuries from the Dalkon IUD.' °3 The Court rejected the State's
argument that this advertisement posed the same kind of risk as the in-
person advertising in Ohralik " The Court held unequivocally that a state
could not discipline a lawyer for "soliciting legal business through printed
advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive information."'0 5 Returning
to its position in Bates,0 6 the Court rejected the State's argument that a ban
191 (1982)). The charges also alleged R.M.J. sent this advertisement to unsanctioned
members of the public. Id. Faced with R.M.J.'s challenge, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the rule was constitutional and that R.M.J. did violate it. R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d at 412.
97. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206-07.
98. Id. at 203. "Although the potential for deception and confusion is particularly
strong in the context of advertising professional services, restrictions upon such advertising
may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception." Id.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id. at 206. Powell reasoned that a rule could limit the type size, require an
explanation of United States Supreme Court admission, or require that an attorney send any
advertisement or written communication to the state bar to be kept on file, similar to Rule
7.2(b) of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar
Association. Id. at 206 & n.19.
101. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). For a thorough discussion of Zauderer, see Horace E. Johns,
How the Zauderer Decision Impacted Case-Specific Solicitation in Lawyer Advertising, 26
COMP. JURID. REv. 107 (1989).
102. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631.
103. Id. This representation would be based on a contingency fee. Id.
104. Id. at 642.
105. Id. at 647.




on attorney advertising is needed to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession. 107
Nonetheless, the Court did uphold a portion of the challenged
regulations. The Court concluded that Ohio's regulation requiring disclosure
of fees, costs, and potential liability for litigation costs, did not unnecessarily
burden or restrict lawyers.'08 Thus, the Court failed to give the State a
broad brush but also held that the State did not have to follow the "least
restrictive means" in implementing its rule.'0 9
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n," the Court struck down a state
regulation on targeted, direct mail advertising by attorneys.'" The Court
held that the state did not have a substantial interest in preventing direct
mail solicitation of clients, because a recipient could be free of any potential
harassment by simply throwing the letter in the trash."' Shapero drafted a
letter to send to people named in pending foreclosure actions and sent a
copy of the proposed letter to the State's Attorney Advertising Commission
for approval." 3  The letter stated that if the recipients would contact
Shapero's office he might be able to stop their creditors' actions and allow
them to keep their homes." 4 The Commission declined approval, "15and
107. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641, 647-48. "[W]e are unsure that the State's desire that
attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is an interest
substantial enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights." Id. at 648.
108. Id. at 653 n.15. Zauderer's advertisement stated, "If there is no recovery, no legal
fees are owed by our clients." Id. at 631. While it is true that no legal fees would be owed,
the Court found that the potential for deception existed because many readers would not
know the difference between legal "fees" and litigation "costs." Id. at 652-53.
109. Id. at 651 & n.14.
110. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
111. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470. A.B.A. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3 (1984),
as used by Kentucky, stated, "A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by
mail, in-person, or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain ...." Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470-71 (citing 726 S.W.2d 299, 301
(Ky. 1987)). The Court ruled that such a "blanket prohibition" violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 471. The Court dismissed the idea that this case was "Ohralik in
writing" by stating, "In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue influence, the
mode of communication makes all the difference." Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 475-76, 479. The Court stated, "[S]o long as the First Amendment protects
the right to solicit legal business, the State may claim no substantial interest in restricting
truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the
recipient." Id. at 479.
113. Id. at 469.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Commission found the letter truthful, but still in conflict with the rules.
Id. at 469, 473.
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Shapero appealed the constitutionality of the ethical rule on which the
Commission's decision rested to the United States Supreme Court."6
On appeal, the State argued that under Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass 'n" 7 it could completely ban all advertising it felt would unreasonably
influence recipients." 8 The Court did not agree, however, and found that
written solicitations did not present the same dangers as the in-person
solicitations at issue in Ohralik."9 The Court reasoned that it is much easier
for a recipient of a letter, or any printed advertisement, to avoid the
harassment and invasion of privacy often associated with in-person
solicitation. 2 Even though the Court acknowledged that targeted direct
mail solicitation could have some ill effects,' 2 ' it held that measures were
available short of a complete ban to police this practice. 122 Following
Shapero, states' efforts to curb client solicitation by lawyers have focused
on imposing waiting periods instead of complete bans."
Two years later, in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Commission, 24 the Court struck down yet another attempt to limit client
solicitation. 25  The Illinois statute in question prohibited lawyers from
including any "certified" specialties on their letterhead. 26 In his letterhead,
116. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted, 484
U.S. 814 (1987).
117. 436 U.S. 447 (1983). See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Ohralik.
118. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474-75.
119. Id. at 475. The Court stated that there were two factors in Ohralik that distinguish
in-person and direct mail solicitation. First, in-person solicitation is "a practice rife with
possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and
outright fraud," and second it could not be effectively regulated "short of an absolute ban"
as the practices of attorneys were "not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny." Id.
(quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58, 464-66).
120. Id. at 475-76. "A letter, like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can
readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded." Id.
121. Id. at 476. These problems include: (1) the recipient overestimating the lawyer's
familiarity with the case, (2) the recipient believing the legal problem is more dire than it
really is, and (3) erroneous legal advice provided in letters. Id.
122. Id. The Court suggested that states set up evaluation committees to monitor lawyer
mailings and only punish those who actually violate their right to advertise. Id.
123. Joanne Pitulla, The Ethics of Common Decency, 80 A.B.A. J., August 1994, at 96
(1994). Nevada, New Mexico, Iowa, Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas have either passed
or currently are considering regulations imposing waiting periods or outright bans on targeted
direct mail solicitation of accident victims or their families. Id.
124. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
125. Id. at 111.
126. Id. at 97. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2-105(a)(3)
provides: "Except as set forth in Rule 2-105(a) [exceptions made for patent, trademark, and
admiralty lawyers], no lawyer may hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'specialist."' Peel,
496 U.S. at 97 & n.8.
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Peel truthfully stated that he was a "Certified Civil Trial Specialist. ' 127 The
Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois argued that the terms "certified" and "specialist" suggested to a
recipient that Peel was more qualified than other lawyers in trial work.
128
Contending that the general public cannot distinguish between a legitimate
legal association and a "fly-by-night" organization, the Commission wanted
all such claims ruled misleading.1 29 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
rejected the assumption that the public was gullible or naive enough for
Peel's letterhead to be deceptive. 3 The Court did not rule that states
cannot prohibit lawyers from advertising the quality of their services; rather,
it held that a claim of certification is "verifiable" and not a proclamation of
quality.1
3 1
Thus, lawyer advertising through print and electronic media has
acquired more and more protection over the past two decades. Nevertheless,
as the Court entered 1995, several of the former proponents of lawyer
advertising no longer remained on the Court. 132 Accordingly, the reasoning
of Florida Bar differed.
127. Peel, 496 U.S. at 96. The National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA) listed Peel
in its 1985 Directory of "Certified Specialists and Board Members." Id.
128. Id. at 97.
129. Id. at 109-10.
130. Id. at 104-05. The Court stated:
[I]t seems unlikely that petitioner's statement about his certification as a
specialist by an identified national organization necessarily would be
confused with formal state recognition .... [O]ne can readily think of
numerous other claims of specialty from air conditioning specialist ... to
foreign car specialist... that cast doubt on the notion that the public would
automatically mistake a claim of specialization for a claim of formal
recognition by the State.
Id. at 104-05 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
131. Id. at 101. Just because a "consumer may or may not draw an inference of the
likely quality of an attorney's work" by a claim of certification does not provide sufficient
grounds for a prophylactic ban. Id.
132. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall all joined the majority in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), and consistently voted to expand First Amendment
protection of lawyer advertising. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S.-91 (1990) (all three joined the majority with Marshall concurring); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (Brennan wrote the majority opinion, and Marshall
and Blackmun joined); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel for the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (all three joined in the portion of the majority opinion which
extended First Amendment protection); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (all three joined
the majority); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (Blackmun and Marshall concurred
separately, with Brennan taking no part).
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Florida Bar, the Court upheld, under a Central Hudson3 3 analysis,
Florida Supreme Court's rules of professional conduct barring lawyers from
inundating accident victims and their families with direct mail solicitations
within thirty-days of an accident.'34 Through its reliance on the study
submitted by the Florida Bar, the Court demonstrated how important actual
research and data is to a state's regulation of lawyer advertising.'35 The
Court continued to acknowledge that commercial speech receives less First
Amendment protection than other forms of speech as it applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny.'36 Justice O'Connor, who consistently
dissented in previous lawyer advertising cases,'37 wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Breyer. 138
In its application of Central Hudson, 9 the Court continued to hold that
the government could indiscriminately regulate false or misleading
commercial speech. 4 ° Having no difficulty finding that the speech in
question was not unlawful or misleading, the Court quickly moved on to the
remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson test.'' The majority found
that the Florida Bar was, in fact, protecting a substantial state interest in its
regulation of direct mail solicitation by lawyers.'42 Second, the Court found
that the thirty-day ban "directly and materially" affected the interest the Bar
sought to protect.'43 Completing its analysis, the Court found that the
133. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
134. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
135. Id. at 2378, 2381. See H. Ritchey Hollenbaugh, From the Chair, LAWYER
ADVERTISING NEWS (A.B.A. Comm. on Advertising), August 1995, at 1. See also Gary
Blankenship, Panel to Take Fresh Look at Ad Rules, THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, July 15, 1995,
at 1. "It [the Florida Bar decision] tells us we must have a study and the rules have to be
consistent with the results of that study." Id. (quoting John DeVault, Florida Bar president).
136. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2375.
137. Id. at 2371. Justice O'Connor had led a vocal minority of the Court arguing that
lawyer advertising harmed the professionalism and dignity of the legal field. See Thier,
supra note 6, at 544; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
U.S. 91, 119 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S.
466, 490 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 678 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2371.
139. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980). See also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for discussion of test.
140. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. See P. Cameron DeVore, Commercial Speech
Redux in the 1994 Term, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Fall 1995, at 12.
141. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
142. Id. at 2376.
143. Id. at 2376, 2378.
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restriction only banned that speech necessary to protect the state's interest.'"
With regard to the second prong of the Central Hudson test, the Florida
Bar asserted that there were two state interests at hand, one being the
reputation of the legal profession and judicial system,'45 and the other being
the privacy interest of accident victims.'46 The Court agreed with the
Florida Bar on both assertions, holding that a state often has a direct interest
in both regulating the professions within its borders and protecting its
citizens' privacy and safety.'47
The Court proceeded to consider whether the regulations directly and
materially advanced the government's interest. 48 In the majority's
evaluation, it considered Edenfield v. Fane4 9 in which the Court struck
down a Florida regulation prohibiting in-person solicitations by accountants,
in part, because the Board of Accountancy, who advocated the regulation,
failed to present research and facts showing actual harm to Floridians. 5 '
Proclaiming the thoroughness of the Florida Bar study, the Court held that
the Florida Bar did not have the same problem as the Board of Accountancy
because the bar submitted a one-hundred-six page study surveying how
direct mail solicitation by lawyers following an accident actually harmed
Floridians. 5 ' Justice O'Connor emphasized that, in the past, the Court had
144. Id. at 2380-81.
145. Id. at 2376. But see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), when the Court ruled that the state may not prohibit citizens
from hearing truthful advertising simply to maintain the professional standards among
pharmacists. Id. at 773. Regarding other professions, the Court stated; "Physicians and
lawyers . . . do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of
almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and
deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id. at 773 n.25.
146. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376.
147. Id. at 2376. "'States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries, and . . . they have broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions."' Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)). "Our precedents also leave no room for doubt that the
'protection of potential clients' privacy is a substantial state interest."' Id. (quoting Edenfield
v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1799 (1993)).
148. Id. at 2377.
149. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
150. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. 'See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1795 (asserting that
in-person solicitation by CPAs created the dangers of fraud, overreaching, and independence
compromising). See also Hollenbaugh, supra note 135, at 1 ("It is clear, then, that research
has become a paramount element of the formula necessary to create constitutionally
permissible limits on lawyer advertising.").
151. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2377. "[W]e are satisfied that the ban on direct mail
solicitation in the immediate aftermath of accidents, unlike the rule at issue in Edenfield,
targets a concrete, nonspeculative harm." Id. at 2378. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text for discussion of the study results.
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permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by introducing studies which
covered locations unrelated to the case being considered.'52
In reaching its decision, the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's
application of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n. 53 The majority pointed out
that in Shapero the State argued that targeted solicitation by attorneys
constituted overreaching but failed to make a citizens' privacy interest
argument.'54 To further distinguish Shapero, the Court noted that the
advertising restriction in Shapero was a complete ban while the one in
Florida Bar involved only a waiting period.' Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, in Shapero, the State presented no data proving "actual harm"
to its citizens.",
The Court also failed to find its decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.' controlling. 5 The Bolger Court had ruled that the
inconvenience placed upon recipients of direct mail advertising simply did
not rise to a level sufficient to justify a restriction on commercial speech.'59
The majority distinguished Bolger from Florida Bar, in that the outrage
caused by a lawyer's direct mail solicitation of accident victims could not
be remedied by the short trip to a trash can to discard such letters."6 Given
the conclusions of the uncontested study' 6 ' and the differences between the
152. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986) (allowing the City of Renton to rely on a study conducted in Seattle,
Washington when upholding a Renton city ordinance restricting adult film theaters). See also
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (upholding an Indiana regulation
without the state presenting localized proof that its public indecency law actually prevented
crime within that community).
153. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). For a discussion of Shapero, see supra notes 110-23 and
accompanying text.
154. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378-79. The privacy interest at stake is not whether the
attorney knows that an accident has taken place, but rather the fact that the attorney is
soliciting business during the time of personal grief. 1d. at 2379.
155. 1d. Shapero's complete bar only pertained to direct mail solicitation. Id.
156. 1d. at 2378.
157. 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that the government could not ban potentially
"offensive" and "intrusive" direct mail advertisements for contraceptives).
158. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379.
159. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72. The Bolger Court reasoned that the "recipients of
objectionable mailings [contraceptive advertisements] may 'effectively avoid bombardment
of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."' Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). Furthermore, the 'short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash
can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned."' Id.
(quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), summarily aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967)).
160. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2379 ("The Bar is concerned not with citizens' 'offense'
in the abstract ... but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such 'offense' has on
the profession it regulates.").
161. Even though Went For It, failed to challenge the validity of the study, Justice
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cases cited by the dissent, 162 the majority held that the Florida Bar proved
that an actual harm existed and, therefore, satisfied this prong of the Central
Hudson test.1
63
Next, the Court determined whether the means chosen by the Bar
sufficiently addressed this harm."6  Following the holding in Board of
Trustees v. Fox,165 the Court found that the State did not have to use the
least restrictive means to accomplish its goal, but instead, the means need
only be reasonable.' 66 The Court rejected Went For It's arguments that the
regulation kept legal advice from those with the greatest need 167 and that it
was overinclusive,16 noting that it would be very difficult to draft a rule
based on the severity of the accident.1
69
The Court instead stressed that the ban is only in place for thirty days,
and it left many other methods through which Floridians can learn of the
legal services available. 70 Furthermore, the Court recognized that Went For
It failed to present any evidence of a Floridian not receiving legal counsel
due to this regulation.' 7 ' This shortcoming, coupled with the numerous
Kennedy did so in dissent. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He
wrote, "This document includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection
procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results. There
is no description of the statistical universe or scientific framework that permits any
productive use of the information .... ." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
Kennedy pointed out that only two pages of the study summarized actual survey results
dealing with direct mail solicitation. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
163. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2378.
164. Id. at 2380.
165. 492 U.S. 469 (1989); see supra note 47 for discussion of appropriate means.
166. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380.
167. Id. at 2381. Went For It argued that accident victims want and need a lawyer's
advice during this thirty-day period when defense attorneys and insurance adjusters are free
to contact them to collect information and offer settlements. Respondent's Brief at 3, Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) (No. 94-226). In dissent, Justice Kennedy
agreed and argued that the ban was harmful in all situations because prompt legal service is
essential following a serious accident, and victims of small accidents might receive no
compensation because they felt no lawyer would be interested in their claims. Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2380. Went For It argued that the ban was too broad
because it did not differentiate between accident victims suffering great grief from a major
accident and those with minor grief from a relatively small accident. Id.
169. Id. at 2380. In the dissent, Justice Kennedy pointed out the criminal justice system
routinely makes such distinctions, as with the degree of bodily harm. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2380-81 (majority opinion). Some of the methods available are prime-time
television, radio, billboards, newspapers, Yellow Pages, and untargeted letters sent to the
general population. Id.
171. Id. at 2381.
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alternatives available, led the Court to find that the Florida Bar regulation
satisfied the final prong of the Central Hudson test.'72
In finding the thirty-day ban constitutional, the Court reaffirmed that
pure commercial speech receives a lesser degree of First Amendment
protection than other forms of speech. 73 The Court ruled that attorneys
have traditionally been subject to many state bar regulations, therefore, when
advertising as attorneys, they should not expect as much First Amendment
freedom as they would receive if speaking under different circumstances.'74
Of course, four justices did not agree with the majority's conclusion and
chose to join in a dissent. 75
The foundation for Justice Kennedy's dissent lies in the fact that the
Court chose to protect lawyer advertising in 1977,176 and the majority's
decision jeopardizes legal services to those with the greatest need for
them. 177 Kennedy maintained that the financial interests of accident victims
were at stake in this case as well as the financial interests of the lawyers
sending the direct mail solicitations.77 Kennedy asserted that Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass 'n179 should control because the burden to citizens is the
same in both instances.80 He argued that instead of focusing on the current
emotional state of recipients of lawyer advertising, which the Shapero Court
ruled irrelevant, the majority should have focused on the actions taken by
the Florida lawyers.' 8 ' Kennedy claimed that the majority only tried to
protect Floridians from speech they may find offensive,8 2 which was an
inadequate concern according to the Court's previous holdings.8 3
172. Id.
173. Id.; see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that purely
commercial, or for-profit, speech was entitled to some First Amendment protection on its own
merits).
174. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381. "[It is all the more appropriate that we limit our
scrutiny of state regulations to a level commensurate with the 'subordinate position' of
commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values." Id. (citation omitted).
175. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
176. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This constitutional protection originated in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
177. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning further restriction of commercial
speech might result in a lack of knowledge causing unfair compensation to injured persons).
179. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
180. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See supra note 119 for
the Shapero Court's reasoning.
181. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2382 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stressing the significance
of the fact that the solicitation in question came through the mail).
182. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 648 (1985) ("[T]he mere possibility that some members of the population might find
[Vol. 19
1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Furthermore, Kennedy argued that a thirty-day ban on commercial
speech was not the proper way for the Bar to protect the reputation of
lawyers and concluded that the ban was simply a form of censorship." 8
Through this censorship, Kennedy wrote, the majority did a great injustice
to the field of commercial speech" 5 and, in fact, actually harmed the
reputation of the legal profession through its actions as a censor.8 6
V. SIGNIFICANCE
In Florida Bar, the Supreme Court seemed to speak for that segment
of the legal community who believes that lawyer advertising only harms the
legal profession. 87 Although the Court's decision is fairly limited, 88 it is
a step toward allowing states more authority to police advertising by the
advertising ... offensive cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for
advertising that some members of the bar might find beneath their dignity."); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) ("[W]e have never held that the
Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might
potentially be offended."); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)
(holding that advertisements that citizens find embarrassing or offensive "are classically not
justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment").
184. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State is doing
nothing more than manipulating the public's opinion by suppressing speech that informs us
how the legal system works. . . .This, of course, is censorship pure and simple; and
censorship is antithetical to the first principles of free expression.").
185. Id. at 2386 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is most ironic that, for the first time since
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court now orders a major retreat from the constitutional
guarantees for commercial speech in order to shield its own profession from public
criticism.").
186. Id. Justice Kennedy stated,
If public respect for the profession erodes because solicitation distorts the
idea of the law as most lawyers see it, it must be remembered that real
progress begins with more rational speech, not less . . . . The Court's
opinion reflects a new-found and illegitimate confidence that it, along with
the Supreme Court of Florida, knows what is best for the Bar and its clients.
Self-assurance has always been the hallmark of a censor .... By validating
Florida's rule, today's majority is complicit in the Bar's censorship.
Id.
187. Chief Justice Warren Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
949 (1995). Chief Justice Burger illustrated this sentiment by stating: "The law is not and
never has been a 'business.' But we are well on the way to making it less than a
profession. . . . I see disturbing evidence that there has been a broad decline in
professionalism over the past twenty to twenty-five years .... Id. at 949.
188. See DeVore, supra note 140, at 12. One commentator believes that Justice Breyer's
surprising vote with the majority had a "powerful chastening effect on the majority opinion."
According to this commentator, Breyer apparently forced O'Connor to distinguish Shapero
and place great significance on the short-term character of the ban. DeVore, supra note 140,
at 13.
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legal profession.' 9 There is little doubt that some members of the legal
profession will welcome such a movement. 9°
With several states sure to follow the Florida Bar's lead, one must
consider whether the results of the Florida Bar's survey can be transferred
from Florida to other parts of the nation. The Court has allowed such
imputation in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 91 and Barnes v. Glen
Theatres, Inc.92 In the earlier case, the City of Renton defended its anti-
adult theater ordinance by relying on a study conducted in the nearby city
of Seattle, Washington. 93 The Court allowed Renton to rely on the study,
holding that the First Amendment does not mandate that a city conduct an
independent study. 94 The Court relied upon the same rationale in Barnes
to uphold the State of Indiana's anti-nude dancing statute. 95 Based on this
reasoning, Arkansas, or any other state, could argue that the study conducted
by the Florida Bar is not location specific and should be imputed to voice
the opinions of citizens across the nation.
With the Court's restriction on targeted direct mail solicitation, it seems
logical that lawyers, who chose to advertise in this manner, will increase
their efforts on other forms of advertising.'96 The question then arises as to
189. Reuben, supra note 4, at 20. "While most experts agree the Court's ruling was
fairly narrow-perhaps limited to the 30-day 'cooling off period at issue--some say it could
still open the door for more such regulations." Rueben, supra note 4, at 20.
190. Burger, supra note 187, at 950. "Within our profession we now condone advertising
and solicitation of clients, activities that were formally unethical and unprofessional....
One wonders whether we will continue to move away from our established traditions and
canons of professional ethics." Burger, supra note 187, at 950 (quoting John J. Yanas, The
President's Message, N.Y. ST. B. J., May 1990, at 3).
191. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
192. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
193. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 ("We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the
experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the 'detailed findings'
summarized in the Washington Supreme Court's Northend Cinema opinion .... "). In
Northend Cinema the facts stated that the Seattle City Council heard a report from the
Department of Community Development finding that adult theaters led to the "attraction of
transients, parking and traffic problems, increased crime, decreasing property values, and
interference with parental responsibilities for children." Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle,
585 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wash. 1978). This decision lacks any empirical data to substantiate
these claims, whereas the Florida Bar study presented such data. See Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2377 (1995); see supra note 13 for findings of the study.
194. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. "The First Amendment does not require a city, before
enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses." Id. at 51-52.
195. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (allowing Indiana also to impute
the results of the study conducted in Seattle).
196. See Blankenship, supra note 135, at 6. Bruce Rogow, who represented Went For
It, Inc., along with Beverly Pohl, claims that lawyers will increase other forms of advertising
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whether the Court's decision only applies to targeted direct mail or whether
it can be transferred to allow restrictions on other areas of lawyer advertis-
ing.
197
As stated above, 9s other states have been awaiting the outcome of
Florida Bar to impose their own thirty-day ban or similar measures.' 99 On
March 3, 1993, the Arkansas Bar Association and its Professional Ethics and
Grievances Committee petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court to revise its
Rules of Professional Conduct to include a thirty-day ban on direct mail
solicitation of accident victims and their families.2" The court held the
petition in abeyance pending the outcome of Florida Bar.2 '
Following the Florida Bar Court's decision, the Arkansas Bar decided
to withdraw its petition in order to gather empirical data through a study.2"2
The Arkansas Bar Association commissioned Miller Research Group to
conduct a public opinion survey in March 1996.203 If rule changes are found
to be necessary, the Arkansas Bar is more concerned with protecting the
privacy interest of Arkansans than with enhancing the reputation of
lawyers.2 4
Although questions still remain as to how far state bars will be allowed
to go in limiting lawyers' speech, there is no doubt that the Court has
specified a starting point." 5 The Court also affirmed, for the first time,
such as billboards, radio, and television. Blankenship, supra note 135, at 6.
197. See Blankenship, supra note 135, at 6 (quoting Barry Richard, who argued the
Florida Bar's case before the Supreme Court) ("I think the thirty-day rule could be added to
other areas of advertising without any new proof."). See also Marcia Coyle, Ad Decision
Could Spur a Rollback, NAT'L L.J., July 3, 1995, at Al (speculating that the Court's decision
could not only lead to more thirty-day bans, but also to regulation of jingles and slogans,
Yellow Pages advertisements, and billboards).
198. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
199. The Florida Bar Case Stimulates State Action, LAW. ADVERTISING NEWS (A.B.A.
Comm. on Advertising), Aug. 1995, at 1. These states include Alabama, Colorado, New
York, Michigan, Illinois, and New Hampshire. Id.
200. Lucinda McDaniel, Saving Ourselves: How will Arkansas Lawyers Respond to the
Advertising Ban Upheld in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., ARK. LAW., Summer 1995, at
30, 32.
201. Id.
202. Interview with William A. Martin, Executive Director, Arkansas Bar Association,
in Little Rock, Ark. (Oct. 30, 1995). Mr. Martin stated that the Arkansas Bar needed to
conduct its own study as "Arkansans have not been subjected to the excesses [in lawyer
advertising] other states have, so there may not be as much public disgust as other states."
Id.
203. William A. Martin, Another Revisit to Lawyer Advertising, prepared for Arkansas
Bar Ass 'n & Arkansas Judicial Council Joint Meeting, June 14, 1996. "No amount of logic
on the part of lawyers, courts or legislatures will substitute for a soundly conducted study to
establish the effect of advertising by lawyers on the public." Id.
204. Id.
205. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995) (referring to the
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"protection of the legal profession's reputation" as a substantial state interest
to justify a state's regulation.2" As states begin to test the limits of the
Florida Bar decision, it will be interesting to see exactly how much control
the Court is willing to allow state bar associations in their efforts to curb
lawyer advertising, while it also keeps a watchful eye on the First Amend-
ment.
Mark W Hodge
thirty-day ban). See also Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1546 (8th Cir. 1995)
(applying Florida Bar and reaffirming that the Central Hudson test is to apply to restrictions
on commerical speech).
206. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376. See The Florida Bar Case Stimulates State Action,
supra note 199, at 1. If interpreted broadly the language could allow sweeping regulations
of lawyer advertsing. See In re Lassen, 672 A.2d 988, 998 (De. 1996) (citing Florida Bar,
115 S. Ct. at 2380) (stating, "[T]he public's perception of the legal profession and its ability
to regulate itself is essential to the proper functioning of the Bar as a whole.").
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